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Supplemental Environmental Projects: A
Bargain for the Environment
LAURE DROUGHTON*
Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) have been
used increasingly by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in settlement decrees. SEPs, in
general, consist of installing pollution prevention equip-
ment or implementing pollution prevention programs,
thereby achieving environmental benefit in excess of that
which could be realized through injunctive relief. In re-
turn for performing the SEP, the EPA correspondingly de-
creases the penalty the violator must pay. This article
examines the history and use of SEPs and advocates that
inclusion of SEPs in settlement decrees is well within the
EPA's statutory authority under the various statutes for
whose enforcement the EPA is responsible.
I. Introduction
A growing awareness of the inadequacy of end-of-the-
pipe regulation for achieving environmental goals has re-
* This article is dedicated in loving memory of Mary E. Droughton and
Janet T. Walsh, both of whom will always be an inspiration to me.
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suited in a shift in the legislative, regulatory and enforce-
ment focus of Congress and the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to pollution prevention.1 In the
1984 reauthorization of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, also
known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA),2 Congress mandated that industry employ waste
minimization and toxicity reduction approaches and decrease
its reliance upon potentially environmentally dangerous
methods of waste handling, particularly via land treatment.3
Congress passed the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (PPA)
which further emphasizes these goals.4 The PPA implements
the national objective of pollution prevention by mandating a
"program of information collection, technology transfer, and
financial assistance to the States to implement this policy
and to promote the use of source reduction techniques."5
These and other legislative developments have prompted the
EPA to focus greater efforts on pollution prevention programs
through its regulations, policies, and enforcement. 6
Pollution prevention is simply what the words connote:
the reduction of pollution generation. Pollution prevention
methods can include source reduction or waste minimization
techniques. Source reduction addresses waste generation
within the production process,7 generally through "good oper-
ating practices, technology changes, [input] material
1. In addition to a recognition of the limits of command and control regula-
tion, the recent increased attention to non-point source pollution provides addi-
tional impetus to pursue pollution prevention opportunities. Joseph J. Breen &
Michael J. Dellarco, Pollution Prevention: The New Environmental Ethic, in
POLLUTION PREVENTION IN INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES: THE ROLE OF
PROCESS ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 2,3 (Joseph J. Breen & Michael J. Del-
larco eds., 1992).
2. RCRA §§ 1002-11,012,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3. RCRA § 3002(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. PPA §§ 6602-6610, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,101-13,109 (Supp. V 1993).
5. S. REP. NO. 526, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990).
6. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849, 7850 (1991). See also
Speakers Say Prospects for RCRA Reauthorization Seen as Dim, PESTICIDE &
TOXIC CHEM. NEWS, Apr. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn, Allnws.
7. WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. AND PIPER & MARBURY, WASTE
REDUCTION: POLICY & PRACTICE 23-24 (1990) [hereinafter WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT, INC. AND PIPER & MARBURY, WASTE REDUCTION].
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changes, and product changes."8 The PPA specifically
designates source reduction as the preferable method of pol-
lution prevention,9 since if wastes are never generated, no
opportunity for mishandling or exposure exists.10
In contrast, waste minimization encompasses practices
that prevent pollution by removing waste from the regulated
waste stream through reuse, recycling, or destruction or sep-
aration of toxic constituents.1" Destruction and separation
are accomplished using traditional waste management tech-
nologies, such as incineration or extraction processes. The
advantage of this approach, as demonstrated by recent his-
tory, is the relative ease in regulation. 2 Additionally, these
processes do reduce the amount of hazardous waste gener-
ated. The obvious disadvantages are continued waste gener-
ation and the toxic and/or hazardous constituents are often
8. Id. at 24.
9. S. REP. NO. 526, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990).
10. Breen & Dellarco, supra note 1, at 3. Additionally, source reduction
may be necessary to address the nation's hazardous waste problems, since
"many of the benefits of controlling pollution have already been achieved and
... further environmental gains can come only from eliminating pollutants at
the point of generation." WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. AND PIPER & MAR-
BURY, WASTE REDUCTION, supra note 7, at 24.
11. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., SPE-
CIAL REP. NO. OTA-ITE-347, FROM POLLUTION TO PREVENTION: A
PROGRESS REPORT ON WASTE REDUCTION, 20-25 (1987) [hereinaifer
OTA, PROGRESS REPORT].
12. For example, under the National Pollutants Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (NPDES) permit system of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, also
known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), the permittee is required to submit Discharge Monitor-
ing Reports (DMRs) which provide information regarding permit parameter
concentrations in the discharge. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(4)(i) (1994). Exceedances
reported on DMRs function as admissions of guilt and are, therefore, sufficient
evidence of violation to support a motion for summary judgment on the exist-
ence of violations. See, e.g., Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Raymark Indus.,
Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1283, 1285-86 (D. Conn. 1986). The ease with regulation of
traditional command and control techniques results because dischargers are re-
quired to treat their effluent to a certain standard or violate the act. The CWA
is a classic example of how easy it is to regulate such a system with its self-
reporting DMR requirement. There would not be such a direct way to enforce
or regulate pollution prevention/waste minimization efforts.
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only transferred between environmental media rather than
destroyed. 13
Reuse of the waste (either on-site or exchanged with
other industries) or recycling offers a middle-of-the-road al-
ternative. Waste is still generated, but it is either reused as a
raw material in an industrial process or recycled into a usa-
ble material.14 The biggest drawback to either reuse or re-
cycling is regulatory constraints. Once generated, wastes
may become subject to the requirements of the regulatory
system. 15 This system may actually result in greater incen-
tive to dispose of the material rather than to "jump through
hoops" to allow it to be deregulated and reused or recycled.' 6
These considerations and the requirements of the PPA have
resulted in source reduction, rather than waste minimization,
to be the focus of regulatory and enforcement efforts.' 7
The EPA and the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA), in reports submitted to Congress in 1986, concluded
that traditional command and control regulatory approaches
for pollution prevention programs were neither practicable
nor feasible.' 8 Instead they recommended encouraging vol-
13. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7853. For example, vapor
extraction results in volatile constituents being released from solid media, re-
ducing the hazardous property of the solid, but consequently creating air emis-
sions from those same volatile organics. See also Breen & Dellarco, supra note
1, at 3 and Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Forced Volunteerism: The New
Regulatory Push to Prevent Pollution, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1996 (Jan. 22,
1993).
14. WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. AND PIPER & MARBURY, WASTE
REDUCTION, supra note 7, at 29-30. Potentially, a waste may be reused as
generated or may be enhanced by treatment prior to reuse. Treatment options
may include, for example, ion exchange, distillation or dewatering. Id. at 29.
Locating an off-site industry who could use the generated wastes may be aided
by using a waste exchange.
15. Id. at 63-67. However, RCRA attempts to regulate legitimate recycling
activities either not at all or lightly. Id.
16. Black & Hollander, supra note 13, at 1996.
17. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7855. See also Breen &
Dellarco, supra note 1, at 6.
18. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., SPECIAL
REP. NO. OTA-ITE-317, SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE:
FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY 3-4
(1986) [hereinafter OTA, SFxtous REDUCTION]. Both reports support the use of
nonregulatory technical assistance to help industry reduce waste generation.
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untary efforts through increased dissemination of informa-
tion to promote awareness and to provide technological
information. 19 This approach was incorporated into the PPA
and the resultant regulatory actions. The EPA has tried to
further "volunteer" efforts in pollution prevention by incorpo-
rating Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) into set-
tlements for alleged violations of various federal statutes,
including the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),20 the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA),21 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA),22 RCRA,23 CWA24 and the Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Act, also known as the Clean Air Act
(CAA).25 26 The EPA uses the SEP program in enforcement
settlements through which a company may receive a de-
creased fine in return for performing specified pollution pre-
vention activities.27 SEPs offer the advantage of imposing a
Neither supports a regulatory approach prescribing industry action. The EPA
recommended technical and informational assistance to industry. The heart of
the suggested program was information gathering, developing of a waste mini-
mization program, and looking at long-term options after gathering the short-
term information. The OTA focused on in-plant technical assistance as the pre-
ferred method of assistance and recommended grant programs to the states and
the creation of an office to deal with these issues within the EPA. Id. See also
OTA, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-5.
19. OTA, SIuous REDUCTION, supra note 18, at 4.
20. TSCA §§ 2-412, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
21. EPCRA §§ 301-330, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
22. FIFRA §§ 2-31, 7 U.S.C. 8 136-136y (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
23. RCRA §§ 1002-11,012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
24. CWA §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
25. CAA §§ 102-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
26. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT AC-
COMPLISHMENTS REPORT FY 1993, REP. NO. EPA 300-R-94-003, 2-6
(1994) [hereinafter EPA, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS]. Forty-
eight states offer assistance in identifying appropriate Supplemental Environ-
mental Projects (SEPs). Assistance Available from States to Help Companies
Offset Penalties, 17 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1708 (Jan. 7, 1994).
27. Memorandum from James M. Strock, Assistant Administrator, to Re-
gional Administrators, Deputy Regional Administrators, Regional Counsels,
Regional Program Division Directors, Assistant Administrators, General Coun-
sel, Program Compliance Directors, Associate Enforcement Counsels 1 (Feb. 12,
1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter SEP Guidance Memorandum]. The SEP
policy will likely be revised during 1995. The revisions will affect the categories
of acceptable projects, redefine the nexus requirement, and provide guidelines
for calculating penalty offset. Telephone Interview with David Hindin, Team
1995] 793
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penalty that will have a long term environmental benefit in
addition to the punitive effect of extracting monetary
penalties.
This article will discuss the development of pollution pre-
vention as the preferred environmental management alterna-
tive and how SEPs may be used effectively to further this
objective. Particular focus is on whether such actions exceed
the EPA's statutory authority. Part II will examine federal
legislation and regulatory efforts to incorporate pollution pre-
vention into the EPA's programs. Part III will discuss the
SEP program, experiences to date, and the legal basis for in-
clusion of SEPs in enforcement settlements. Part IV will pro-
vide a conclusion.
II. Development of Federal Pollution Prevention
Programs
A. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The EPA derives its power to regulate hazardous waste
from Subtitle III, also known as Subtitle C, of RCRA.28 As
Leader Attorney, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of En-
forcement and Compliance Assurance (Oct. 25, 1994). For a discussion of the
nexus requirement, see § Im(A), infra. See generally Environmental Protection
Agency Civil Penalty Policy, [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:0761 (Feb. 16,
1984) [hereinafter Civil Penalty Policy].
28. RCRA §§ 3001-3023, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939e (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
RCRA Subtitle C, as amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
of 1984 (HSWA), regulates hazardous waste from "cradle to grave." RCRA re-
quires the EPA to establish minimum standards for all aspects of hazardous
waste generation, transportation and treatment, storage or disposal. RCRA is
intended to focus on prospective behavior to avoid future harm to public health
and the environment; however it also incorporates corrective action require-
ments for past releases. Regulated hazardous wastes are either "listed7 or
"characteristic." Listed wastes are set forth in 40 C.F.R. pt. 261, subpt. D. A
listed waste appears on one of four lists: hazardous wastes from non-specific
sources (40 C.F.R. § 261.31 (1994)); hazardous wastes from specific sources (40
C.F.R. § 261.32 (1994)); discarded commercial chemical products, off-specifica-
tion species, container residues and spill residues thereof identified as acute
hazardous wastes (40 C.F.R. § 261.33(e) (1994)); or discarded commercial chem-
ical products, off-specification species, container residues and spill residues
thereof identified as toxic wastes (40 C.F.R. § 261.33(f) (1994)). Characteristic
wastes are described in 40 C.F.R. pt. 261, subpt. C. A characteristic hazardous
waste exhibits one or more of the following characteristics: ignitability (40
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/7
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part of the objectives and national policies behind RCRA,
Congress declared that the generation and land disposal of
hazardous waste should be reduced through "process substi-
tution, materials recovery, properly conducted recycling and
reuse, and treatment."29 To help achieve this objective, Con-
gress included several certification requirements to promote
pollution prevention among hazardous waste generators. On
each manifest accompanying a waste shipment, RCRA re-
quires generators to certify that the generator "has a pro-
gram in place to reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity
of" their waste, and that "the proposed method of treatment,
storage or disposal" be one that "minimizes present and fu-
ture threat to human health and the environment."30 Fur-
ther, RCRA requires that before issuance of a permit to a
treatment, storage or disposal facility (TSDF) for handling
wastes generated on-site, the facility must certify the exist-
ence of a waste-minimization program and the sufficiency of
the treatment, storage or disposal method to protect present
and future human health and the environment.3 1
Although the appropriate manifest forms and permits in-
clude these certification requirements, in reality, they have
little "bite." They do not provide sufficient impetus for pro-
moting effective pollution prevention programs since ade-
quate enforcement and appropriate standards are not
available.32 The EPA has promulgated non-binding guidance
for developing waste minimization programs; but since it is
non-binding, the waste generator may choose to ignore the
C.F.R. § 261.21 (1994)), corrosivity (40 C.F.R. § 261.22 (1994)), reactivity (40
C.F.R. § 261.23 (1994)) or toxicity (40 C.F.R. § 261.24 (1994)).
29. RCRA § 1003(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). How-
ever, RCRA regulates only waste generation and management, not manufactur-
ing processes. WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. AND PIPER & MARBURY,
WASTE REDUCTION, supra note 7, at 63.
30. RCRA § 3002(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The mani-
fest referred to is the standard manifest used to ship hazardous waste off-site
for treatment, storage or disposal. See also 40 C.F.R. § 262.20(a) (1994).
31. RCRA § 3005(h), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
32. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE NATION'S HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS: THE
RCRA IMPLEMENTATION STUDY, REP. NO. EPA-530-SW-90-069, 54 (1990)
[hereinafter EPA, CROSSROADS].
1995] 795
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guidance and the EPA cannot pursue an enforcement action
against the generator.33 Furthermore, the certification does
not require any affirmative, specific commitment regarding
degree of waste reduction.3 4 The generator-determined de-
gree of waste reduction is not reviewable by the EPA.3 5
Of greater potential merit are the technology-forcing pro-
visions of the RCRA "land-ban" sections. Land-ban require-
ments prohibit designated Wastes from land disposal unless
specified pretreatment requirements are deemed adequate to
reduce the mobility and toxicity of the waste such that the
treated residual can be safely land disposed. 36 These provi-
sions result in increased disposal costs to the generator by
requiring either alternate treatment or disposal or pretreat-
ment prior to land disposal. 37 This regulatory scheme pro-
33. Id. See Guidance to Hazardous Waste Generators on the Elements of a
Waste Minimization Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,114 (1993). The guidance sug-
gests the following elements should be incorporated into a waste minimization
program: "(1) [tlop management support; (2) characterization of waste genera-
tion and waste management costs; (3) periodic waste minimization assess-
ments; (4) appropriate cost allocation; (5) encouragement of technology
transfer; and (6) program implementation and evaluation." Id.
34. The generator need only certify the waste minimization efforts be to
"the degree determined by the generator to be economically practicable." RCRA
§§ 3002(b)(1), 3005(h)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(b)(1), 6925(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
35. S. REP. NO. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1983).
36. See RCRA § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The federal
land disposal restrictions (LDRs), or land ban regulations, apply to RCRA haz-
ardous wastes which are land disposed or placed. 40 C.F.R. § 268.1 (1994). The
EPA may set one of three types of treatment standards, which are all based on
the best demonstrated available technology (BDAT) identified for the waste.
The standard may be: (1) a concentration level to be achieved prior to disposal,
40 C.F.R. §§ 268.41, 268.43 (1994); (2) a specified technology to be used, 40
C.F.R. § 268.42 (1994); or (3) a "no land disposal" designation, issued when the
waste is no longer generated, is totally recycled, is not currently being land
disposed or no hazardous residuals are produced from treatment. The applica-
ble standard must be met prior to land disposal of the waste. See 40 C.F.R. pt.
268 (1994).
37. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7852. Hazardous wastes
banned from land disposal may only be stored for the purpose of accumulation
of quantities necessary for proper recovery, treatment or disposal. RCRA
§ 3004(j), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(j) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In general, a generator
may accumulate hazardous waste on-site without a permit for up to 90 days. 40
C.F.R. § 262.34(a) (1994). Therefore, storage is not a feasible long-term alterna-
tive once a waste is prohibited from land disposal.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/7
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS
vides an economic incentive to reduce pollution generated.38
However, although promising as a market-incentive, since all
manufacturers will be subject to the same requirements and
no additional incentives are provided to encourage pollution
prevention, the waste generator may simply pass the addi-
tional cost to the consumer. Thus, the potential incentive to
the generator to reduce its waste would be lessened.
B. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act
In response to the relative lack of pollution prevention
progress achieved through RCRA, Congress passed the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
in 1986.3 9 Congress wanted EPCRA to stimulate the indus-
trial community to comply with environmental laws and to
further reduce pollution generation. 40 These goals were to be
achieved by providing information directly to the public, with
the hope that change would come through political pres-
sure.41 EPCRA has four major sections: emergency plan-
ning,'42 emergency notification,43 community right-to-know
reporting requirements,44 and the Toxics Chemical Release
38. EPA, CROSSROADS, supra note 32, at 39-40.
39. EPCRA §§ 301-330, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
40. Steven D. Newburg-Rinn, Right-To-Know and Pollution Prevention Leg-
islation, in POLLUTION PREVENTION IN INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES: THE
ROLE OF PROCESS ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 1, at 21.
41. Id.
42. EPCRA §§ 301-303, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,003 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The emergency planning sections designate substances and facilities covered by
the requirements, provide notification requirements for covered facilities and
furnish guidelines for developing comprehensive emergency response plans at
covered facilities. Id.
43. EPCRA § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 11,004 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). EPCRA re-
quires reporting of certain releases of extremely hazardous substances exceed-
ing reportable quantities. Id. § 11,004(a). This requirement applies to the
owner or operator of any facility at which a "hazardous chemical is produced,
used, or stored." Id. Federally permitted releases and releases that result in
exposure to persons solely within the site or sites on which the facility is located
are exempt from the notification requirement. Id. § 11,004(a)(4). The list of
regulated substances and associated reportable quantities is provided in 40
C.F.R. pt. 355, Appendices A and B.
44. EPCRA §§ 311-312, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,021-11,022 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
These sections require submission of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and
1995] 797
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Inventory (TRI).45 The TRI is the predominant pollution pre-
vention component of the statute. The TRI requires annual
reporting of direct releases to all environmental media for
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes 20-39 with
ten or more full-time employees that manufacture or process
more than 25,000 pounds or use more than 10,000 pounds of
any one of approximately 330 chemicals or chemical catego-
ries.46 The annual release forms are "intended to provide in-
formation to the Federal, State, and local governments and
the public, including citizens of communities surrounding
covered facilities."47
The TRI requirements have been a "powerful incentive"
for manufacturing facilities to reduce their emissions 48 be-
cause, in essence, the manufacturer must justify... releases
to the environment."49 Since EPCRA's enactment, and its
subsequent success in encouraging industry to take a hard
look at pollution emission levels, the EPA Administrator has
called for voluntary participation in the "industrial toxics
project," also called the "33/50" program.50 The program's
goals are to cut nationwide emissions of seventeen key chemi-
cals by thirty-three percent by the end of 1992 and by fifty
percent by the end of 1995.51 Mandatory participation in re-
porting TRI releases and voluntary participation in the 33/50
program could potentially have a significant impact in pro-
viding incentive to industry regarding pollution prevention.
an annual emergency and hazardous chemical inventory form from regulated
facilities.
45. EPCRA § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
46. EPCRA § 313(a)-(c), (f), 42 U.S.C. § 11,023(a)-(c), f) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 11,023(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
48. Tom Anderson, Making Progress: 4 Corporations Report Headway as
They Strive to Cut Pollution, REP. DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 1993, at 14A.
49. Id. The manufacturers have to confront pollution as an aspect of doing
business. Since the manufacturer's emissions inventory is made public, each
manufacturer's good will is at stake at the time of publication. Id.
50. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7851.
51. Id. In 1991, nationwide TRI emissions were reduced 33.2%, while in
1992, 40.1% reductions were reported. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, 1992 TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PUBLIC DATA RELEASE,
REP. NO. EPA 745-R-94-001, 263 (1994).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/7
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C. Pollution Prevention Act of 1990
In the PPA, Congress declared the national pollution pre-
vention policy to be:
that pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source
whenever feasible; pollution that cannot be prevented
should be recycled in an environmentally safe manner,
whenever feasible; pollution that cannot be prevented or
recycled should be treated in an environmentally safe
manner whenever feasible; and disposal or other release
into the environment should be employed only as a last re-
sort and should be conducted in an environmentally safe
manner.
52
Congress relied on two methods to implement this policy and
promote the use of source reduction techniques: (1) informa-
tion collection and dissemination and (2) technical and finan-
cial assistance to the states.53 In addition, in the PPA,
Congress mandated increased reporting requirements of the
TRI under EPCRA. 54 Congress designed the PPA to be a
"first step toward accomplishing pollution prevention objec-
tives," relying on voluntary reduction of pollutants through
the implementation of the PPA requirements.55
D. EPA Implementation
During the summer of 1988, the EPA established its Of-
fice of Pollution Prevention.56 The Office has been actively
promoting pollution prevention through technology trans-
fer.57 Shortly after passage of the PPA the Office further fo-
52. PPA § 6602(b), 42 U.S.C. § 13,101(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
53. S. REP. NO. 526, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990). Specifically, under the
PPA, the EPA is required to develop and implement a strategy to promote
source reduction, make matching grants to States, establish a national
clearinghouse on source reduction techniques, coordinate and improve informa-
tion collection under RCRA and TRI, report to Congress on progress, and estab-
lish an Office of Pollution Prevention. Id. at 2.
54. PPA § 6607, 42 U.S.C. § 13,106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
55. S. REP. NO. 526, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990).
56. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7855.
57. Id. The Pollution Prevention Office's accomplishments include holding
agency-wide innovative pollution prevention projects competitions; setting up
1995] 799
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cused its mission with the publication of the EPA's Pollution
Prevention Strategy.58 The strategy provides guidance for
the incorporation of pollution prevention into existing regula-
tory programs and sets forth a program for achieving pollu-
tion prevention goals. 59 The latter objective refers to
programs, such as the industrial toxics project, where pollu-
tion prevention is to be promoted throughout various indus-
tries, agriculture and at federal facilities through voluntary
efforts and partnering with the EPA.60 The former objective
strives to incorporate pollution prevention into the EPA's op-
erations in programs and regional offices. 61
Beyond promoting voluntary reduction efforts, the EPA
plans to integrate pollution prevention into its programs us-
ing the following approaches:
Identify and overcome regulatory and nonregulatory
barriers; 62
Expand public participation and choice;63
Access the states' grant program to promote pollution pre-
vention technologies and applications;64
the Pollution Prevention Information Clearinghouse; coordinating the rulemak-
ing for the pulp and paper industry which is designed to eliminate dioxin forma-
tion during the bleaching process; developing the states' grants program; and
creating an audit guide. Id.
58. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849.
59. Id. at 7852.
60. Id. The industrial toxics project is discussed infra at Section H(B).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7856-57. To overcome these barriers, the EPA will investigate
current obstacles, provide technical assistance to states and industry, improve
identification of releases to specific media, assess legislative and regulatory im-
pacts of alternative methods of reducing pollution, identify incentives to imple-
ment alternatives, and continue operation of the Pollution Prevention
Information Clearinghouse. Id.
63. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7857. The EPA will in-
crease information sharing to individuals, businesses and communities. Id. In
addition, it will assess environmental and health consequences of various con-
sumer products and try to "harness consumer power" to influence business to
develop "environmentally friendly" products. Id. Further, the EPA will work
with other federal agencies to develop appropriate labelling guidelines. Id. at
7857-58.
64. Id. at 7858. Recognizing the role states have played in fostering pollu-
tion prevention, the EPA will continue to provide grant money for states to use
on qualifying projects. Id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/7
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Provide outreach and training to government, industry,
academia, and the public; 65
Investigate methods to encourage pollution prevention
within the permitting programs;66
Improve cross-media evaluation for certain chemicals and
their sources;67
Use TSCA to create pollution prevention incentives;68
Increase research;69
Identify emerging products and technologies that use and
foster pollution prevention approaches; 70 and
Incorporate pollution prevention conditions in enforcement
settlements. 71
As outlined above, the Pollution Prevention Strategy
generally attempts to achieve pollution prevention goals
through voluntary efforts. One notable exception is the en-
65. Id. Outreach and training programs will include continuing use of the
Pollution Prevention Information Clearinghouse, developing technical and non-
technical resources, establishing training programs for government employees
and industry, and developing elementary school through university pollution
prevention curriculum materials. Id.
66. Id. at 7859. The EPA will enter into enforceable commitments to
achieve emissions reductions of ninety to ninety-five percent from a baseline
year. Id. In permitting, the EPA will encourage alternatives to conventional
treatment processes. Id. The EPA will work with industries to develop practi-
cal alternatives and will consider new permitting processes to allow testing and
operation. Id.
67. Id. This will be accomplished by categorizing rules by pollution sources,
which have been referred to as regulatory clusters. Id. Evaluating alternatives
in terms of the clusters will result in accurate evaluation of cumulative impacts
to affected sources. Id.
68. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7859. Under TSCA, the
EPA may control the use of specific chemical substances in commerce and man-
ufacturing. Id. When a particular substance presents an unreasonable risk to
human health, limitations on its use may provide pollution prevention incen-
tives. Id.
69. Id. The EPA research provides information on available pollution pre-
vention opportunities for various business sectors. Id. The EPA's immediate
priority focuses on the contaminants and sources targeted in the industrial tox-
ics project. Id.
70. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7860. These goals will be
achieved through several of the programs discussed above. Id.
71. Id. at 7859. Pollution prevention conditions are incorporated into set-
tlement agreements as SEPs. Id.
13
802 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
forcement strategy, discussed in Part III. The EPA's enforce-
ment policy incorporates pollution prevention goals by
allowing and encouraging the inclusion of SEPs in negotiated
settlements. 72 The EPA will continue to use SEPs during
EPA Administrator Carol Browner's tenure.73 Once incorpo-
rated into a consent decree, the pollution prevention project
becomes mandatory and enforceable.7 4
III. Supplemental Environmental Projects
A. The SEP Program
The SEP program allows industry to avoid paying a por-
tion of penalty fines by installing pollution control equipment
or implementing pollution prevention programs. 7 5 There are
five acceptable categories of SEPs: pollution prevention, pol-
lution reduction, environmental restoration, environmental
auditing, and public awareness projects. 76 To gain approval,
72. Id. The EPA estimates that ninety-five percent of enforcement actions
result in settlement. Criminal Cases, Fine Collections Rise in 1993, EPA Says
in Report on Enforcement, 24 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1516,
1517 (Dec. 17, 1993) [hereinafter Criminal Cases, Fine Collections Rise].
73. New Directions Predicted for EPA Enforcement Policy, PESTICIDE &
TOXIC CHEM. NEWS, Jan. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn, Pubs. Fur-
thermore, SEPs are being used in response to Executive Order 12,898, in which
President Clinton called on federal agencies to incorporate environmental jus-
tice principles into their operations. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629
(1994). The EPA will be encouraging the use of SEPs in target communities to
achieve the agency goals of "(1) ensuring that no segment of the population
'bears disproportionately high and adverse effects of environmental pollution;'
and (2) educating and empowering everyone... to 'ensure early participation in
the environmental decision-making process, form partnerships and achieve en-
vironmental justice to help promote sustainable communities.'" Special Report:
EPA Eyes Enforcement Plan Emphasizing Civil Rights, HAZARDOUS WASTE
NEWS, (May 9, 1994) available in LEXIS, Envirn, Allnws.
74. EPA, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS, supra note 26, at 2-2.
See also SEP Guidance Memorandum, supra note 27, at 12-13.
75. During the publication process of this comment, the EPA instituted an
Interim Revised Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy that became ef-
fective on May 8, 1995. This new policy broadens SEP categories, amends legal
deficiencies associated with the prior policy, and "makes the concept more 'user
friendly.'" Lynn L. Bergeson, EPA Revises Supplemental Environmental
Projects Policy, POLLUTION ENGNEnING, July 1995, at 37.
76. SEP Guidance Memorandum, supra note 27, at 2-4. Pollution preven-
tion projects generally address source reduction. Id. at 2. Pollution reduction
projects reduce emissions to levels well below required regulatory or permitted
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the SEP must benefit the general public and not be a statu-
tory requirement with which the company would have had to
comply unless compliance is significantly ahead of schedule. 77
In general, the EPA will be receptive to a project if it "fur-
thers the Agency's statutory mandates to clean up the envi-
ronment and deter violations of the law."7 8 Projects deemed
to be "sound business practices" are not acceptable SEPs.7 9
Implementation of sound business practices, although per-
haps beneficially affecting the environment, are within the vi-
olator's economic self-interest and, therefore, are not
considered an acceptable offset for the payment of a
penalty.80
A "vertical or horizontal nexus" to the violation is re-
quired for a SEP to be acceptable.81 A vertical nexus exists
where the SEP results in reducing future emissions to offset
past excess emissions of the same pollutant to the same me-
dium.82 A horizontal nexus exists where the project ad-
dresses different media at the same facility or the same
media at a different facility.83 A project with a horizontal
nexus to the violation is less likely to be approved than one
levels or incorporate an accelerated compliance schedule. Id. at 2-3. Environ-
mental restoration projects repair the damage resulting from the violation and,
in addition, enhance the environment in the vicinity of the violating facility.
Id. at 3. Environmental auditing projects must go beyond "sound business
practices" to seek out facility practices contributing to environmental problems.
Id. at 3-4. Public awareness projects educate the public or disseminate techni-
cal information to the community. Id. at 4. Projects not acceptable include
funding research at educational institutions, general public awareness projects,
or projects unrelated to the violation. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 2-3.
78. Id. at 1.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id. However, where a project will result in significant, long-term envi-
ronmental benefits, implementation of a sound business practice may be
deemed an acceptable project. Id.
81. SEP Guidance Memorandum, supra note 27, at 6.
82. Id. at 6. For example, if a facility's discharges violate the CWA, a per-
missible SEP would be to undertake a reduction of similar pollutant discharges
of another facility along the same waters. Id.
83. Id. at 7. An acceptable SEP demonstrating a horizontal nexus would be
a facility's reduction of emissions to compensate for health risks to a commu-
nity, due to the same facility's violations. Id.
1995] 803
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with a vertical nexus because of the relation to the
violation.84
SEPs are designed to complement but not replace mone-
tary penalties. The EPA's SEP policy requires that the eco-
nomic benefit of violation be recovered in monetary penalties,
despite the cost of the new equipment or the cost of develop-
ing and implementing the SEP.85 First, the EPA establishes
the gravity of the penalty by considering the circumstances
and extent of the violation.8 6 Second, the EPA reduces the
penalty amount in consideration of the proposed project.8 7
Factors such as the extent of voluntary disclosure, history of
prior violations, delisted chemicals, cooperation of the firm,
the ability of the violator to pay and other factors as the
courts may require are considered when setting penalty
amounts.88
Although a dollar-for-dollar credit against the penalty is
possible, in general the project cost exceeds the penalty re-
duction.89 Joy Technologies, in response to a proposed pen-
alty of $90,000, agreed to a penalty of $20,000 and
performance of a SEP estimated at a gross cost of $350,000.90
Dow Corning agreed to pay a minimum of $500,000 to install
84. Id.
85. Id. at 10. In addition, the general and statute-specific penalty policies
require recoupment of the economic benefit of the violation. See infra text ac-
companying notes 148-151. Furthermore, the SEP policy prohibits lowering the
penalty by more than the amount spent on the project after taxes. SEP Gui-
dance Memorandum, supra note 27, at 10.
86. New EPA Enforcement Policy to Expand Search for Incomplete, Inaccu-
rate TRI Data, 23 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1276, 1277 (Aug.
28, 1992).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Jennifer E. King, CEO Wants Cost Analysis, Says Seminar Co-Chair,
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, July 1993, at 30. The EPA states a company must typi-
cally spend $2.50 on a SEP for each one dollar reduction in fines. Correction, 25
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 325 (June 17, 1994); Use of Supple-
mental Environmental Projects by EPA, States Increasing as Familiarity Grows,
25 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 282 (June 10, 1994). But see infra
text accompanying notes 90-92.
90. EPCRA Enforcement Continues to Feature Other Cleanups, PESTICIDE
& TOXIC CHEM. NEWS, Apr. 29,1992, available in LEXIS, Envirn, Pubs. The
project involved substitution of water-based paint for a solvent-based paint to
eliminate xylene use. Id.
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a chemical spill control device at one of their facilities in ex-
change for a $126,500 penalty reduction.91 Similarly, All
American Pipeline Company completed a SEP in which ex-
isting pump engines were replaced with new engines which
will burn more efficiently, at an estimated cost of at least
$1,000,000 for a corresponding $186,000 penalty reduction. 92
But some examples of less drastic cost differences do exist. A
dollar-for-dollar agreement was reached in In re Harbor Uni-
versal, Inc.93 The consent decree addressed alleged violations
of RCRA and required the metal furniture manufacturer to
incorporate changes in its operations that would reduce the
amount of waste generated.94 This settlement is considered
"novel" and only resulted because the EPA was "extremely
impressed" with the proposed environmental project.9 5
The EPA's Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and,
under certain circumstances, the media Assistant Adminis-
trator must approve an administrative settlement incorporat-
ing a SEP.96 Judicial settlements also require the approval of
the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and, further, re-
quire the approval by the Assistant Attorney General for the
Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ).9  The DOJ publishes notice of all pro-
91. Dow Coming Corp., No. TSCA-91-H-17, 1993 TSCA LEXIS 244 at *5,
*8 (E.P.A. July 13, 1993). Dow Corning had voluntarily disclosed TSCA viola-
tions. Id. at *3. Fifteen percent of the eighty percent reduction was attributed
to Dow Corning's efforts to mitigate the penalty and perform the SEP. Id. at *5.
See also EPA Agrees to Reduce $230,000 Fine 80 Percent for 20 Imports of Un-
certified New TSCA Chemical, 17 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 954 (Aug. 13, 1993).
92. All American Pipeline Co., 59 Fed. Reg. 37,991 (Dep't Justice 1994). All
American Pipeline Company had allegedly violated the prevention of significant
deterioration of air quality (PSD) and new source performance standards
(NSPS) of the CAA. Id.
93. Company Begins Work on Pollution Prevention Project Under Dollar-
for-Dollar Settlement with EPA, 23 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA)
1413 (Sept. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Company Begins Work].
94. Id.
95. Id, The SEP also resulted in reduced generation of certain chemicals
targeted under the 33/50 program. Id.
96. SEP Guidance Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1.
97. Id.
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posed consent decrees in the Federal Register and provides
an opportunity for public review and comment.98
B. Experience in the SEP Program
The EPA has reportedly used SEPs since the early 1980s,
although with much greater frequency recently.9 9 SEPs have
been used most frequently in enforcement of TSCA, and EP-
CRA; however, SEPs have also been used in enforcement of
RCRA, FIFRA, CWA, and CAA.LOO TSCA was the first law
with a SEP-related provision, which specifically allows "set-
tlements with conditions."'0 1 This provision has been part of
TSCA since the 1970s. The CAA also has SEP-related provi-
sions. 0 2 The EPA's general Civil Penalty Policy and its stat-
ute-specific policies also recognize the use of SEPs for penalty
settlement. 10 3 The EPA uses SEPs in up to one in ten en-
forcement settlements, including actions settled both judi-
98. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1992).
99. Growth Expected in Program to Cut Fines in Swap for Participation in
Projects, 16 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 2278 (Feb. 19, 1993) [hereinafter Growth
Expected].
100. Id. In 1992, the EPA used SEPs in 187 mobile air source cases and in
82 cases under EPCRA and TSCA. FY 1992 Enforcement Garners Record $78.7
Million, EPA Says, PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEM. NEWS, June 23, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, Envirn, Pubs. Fifty-two percent of all 1992 SEPs were pollution
reduction projects, 28% were pollution prevention projects, public awareness
projects represented 5%, environmental audits and contributions to local emer-
gency planning committees each constituted 4%, and environmental restoration
accounted for 2%. Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects by EPA, States
Increasing as Familiarity Grows, 25 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA)
282 (June 10, 1994). In 1993, 48% of SEPs were pollution reduction projects,
while 18% were pollution prevention projects. EPA, ENFORCEMENT AC-
COMPLISHMENTS, supra note 26, at 2-6.
101. TSCA § 16(a)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The provision specifically allows the EPA to "compromise, modify or remit, with
or without conditions, any civil penalty which may be imposed under this sub-
section." Id.
102. CAA §§ 113(d)(2)(B), 304(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(d)(2)(B), 7604(g)(2)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 7413 gives the EPA Administrator the author-
ity to "compromise, modify, or remit, with or without conditions," any adminis-
trative penalties. Section 7604 provides that in a citizen suit, the court has the
discretion to order that the penalty be used in "beneficial mitigation projects
which are consistent with this Chapter and enhance the public health or the
environment."
103. See infra text accompanying notes 134-156.
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cially and administratively. 0 4 The EPA estimates that in
1992, more than 400 SEPs were negotiated, totalling an esti-
mated $50.1 million. 10 5 In 1993, 229 SEPs were negotiated,
with an estimated value of $73.8 million.10 6
Typical settlements incorporating SEPs require payment
of a civil penalty and, often, injunctive relief. For example,
the consent decree in United States v. Florida Tile Indus.,
Inc. required the payment of a civil penalty, the performance
of remedial measures to eliminate further stormwater dis-
charges to a lake, and completion of two SEPs.10 7 This decree
adequately addressed the violation and, in addition, provided
for collateral environmental benefit.
SEPs negotiated to date demonstrate a wide variety of
acceptable projects with extensive environmentally beneficial
effects. In United States v. North Am. Philips Corp., the con-
sent decree, lodged to settle alleged violations of the CWA,
required installation of closed loop and evaporation systems
resulting in a significant decrease in the volume of waste-
water discharges. These improvements were completed in
addition to payment of a civil penalty and complete elimina-
tion of the discharge that formed the basis of the com-
plaint. 08 Similarly, in a consent decree addressing violations
of the CAA, Bethlehem Steel Corporation was required to
either install new doors on its coke ovens to reduce emissions
from leaking doors or pay an additional $1.2 million in civil
penalties. 10 9 These projects demonstrate how SEPs can be
used to address potential future violations of environmental
laws by incorporating projects eliminating sources of pollu-
104. Growth Expected, supra note 98, at 2278.
105. EPA 1992 Data Show Criminal Fines Jump; Most Civil Cases Filed
Under TSCA, 17 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 545, 546 (June 4, 1993).
106. EPA, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS, supra note 26, at 2-6.
SEPs and injunctive relief combined were expected to reach at least $800 mil-
lion for 1993. Criminal Cases, Fine Collections Rise, supra note 72, at 1517.
107. Florida Tile Indus., Inc., 58 Fed. Reg. 42,747 (Dep't Justice 1993).
108. North Am. Philips Corp., 57 Fed. Reg. 31,531 (Dep't Justice 1992). The
complaint alleged continual violations of the national categorical pretreatment
standards for the applicable manufacturing categories. Id.
109. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 57 Fed. Reg. 10,041 (Dep't Justice 1992). Beth-
lehem Steel had allegedly violated provisions of the CAA in operating its blast
furnace, coke oven batteries, and a high pressure boiler. Id.
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tion from the industrial process. However, SEP requirements
need not stop at the plant gate. For example, in addition to
paying a civil penalty for CWA violations, the Magna Copper
Company was required to pay $50,000 to the United States
Forestry Service to improve fish habitats in area streams and
to remediate contamination at an off-site abandoned mine.1 10
Also, in Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v.
City of Fall River, in response to water quality violations re-
sulting in part from combined sewer overflow, the SEP man-
dated installation of water-saving devices in the homes of
Fall River residents.' Furthermore, SEPs have required re-
search into a specific industrial process to prevent future pol-
lution. In an administrative action against Southern
Foundry Supply, Inc. for alleged violations of EPCRA, the
SEP required a project "to assess the feasibility of a process to
recover pure nickel" from the foundry waste residues."-2
SEPs have also been used to address potential future vio-
lations through implementation of auditing and training pro-
grams beyond that normally required by existing
environmental statutes. CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT)
agreed to undertake several SEPs in addition to paying civil
penalties in response to allegations of violations of its Na-
tional Pollutants Discharge Elimination Systems (NPDES)
permit."13 The SEPs involve compliance audits at twenty-
two CSXT facilities in the Southeast, environmental audits of
sixty-one of its inactive rail yards, environmental awareness
programs for managers, and development of a manual con-
taining standard operating procedures for handling
stormwater runoff at CSXT yards." 4
110. Magna Copper Co., 59 Fed. Reg. 49,712 (Dep't Justice 1994).
111. No. 87-3067-Z, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3165, at *1,*21-22 (D. Mass. Mar.
11, 1992).
112. EPA Settles with Southern Foundry Supply, Inc., Chattanooga, Tenn.,
for EPCRA Violations, PR NEWSWIRE, June 18, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Envirn, Allnws. The SEP would only be deemed acceptable by the EPA if the
company committed to construction and operation of the new process upon com-
pletion of research. Id.
113. CSX Transportation, Inc., 58 Fed. Reg. 54,375 (Dep't Justice 1993).
114. Id. See also CSX Transportation Agrees to Pay $3 Million to Settle Al-
leged Clean Water Act Violations in Florida and North Carolina, PR NEW-
SWIRE, Sept. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn, Allnws.
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SEPs may also be designed to address environmental
restoration from past operations that is beyond that which
may be obtained through an enforcement action. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Inland Steel Corp., the SEP required
Inland Steel to rectify prior degradations of the environment
in addition to coming into complete compliance with the stat-
utory requirements at issue. 115
Industry generally has been supportive of SEPs.116 A
firm realizes a tax benefit by incorporating a SEP in a settle-
ment agreement since companies can write off the associated
expenditures, either as a business or capital expense.1 7 In
addition, the investment might be a prudent business deci-
sion when a company anticipates future regulations that
would demand the project expense at a later date.118 The
company may also receive good press and enhance its rela-
115. Inland Steel Corp., 58 Fed. Reg. 15,360 (Dep't Justice 1993). The com-
plaint alleged violations of the CWA, the Public Health Service Act, also known
as, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988 & Supp.
V 1993), RCRA, and CAA, including emission of airborne pollutants in excess of
permitted quantities, discharge of water borne pollutants in violation of the
company's NPDES permit, and release of hazardous wastes and hazardous con-
stituents from Inland Steels operations at Indiana Harbor Works. Id. The con-
sent decree included an agreement to spend $26 million on SEPs, most notably
$19 million in sediment remediation of the Grand Calumet River. Id.
116. Growth Expected, supra note 98, at 2278.
117. Id. Penalties are not deductible in any manner. Id. The determination
of whether a particular environmental cleanup or assessment activity is classi-
fied as a currently deductible business expense or capital expense subject to
depreciation is a question of fact. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-25 I.R.B. 4, 1994 IRB
LEXIS 313, at *5-6 (June 20, 1994). The Internal Revenue Service has ruled
that the costs of environmental cleanups are deductible as business expenses if
they do not produce permanent improvements or provide significant future ben-
efits. Id. at *6-7. Significant future benefits will be determined based on a com-
parison of an asset's status after the remediation to its original unpolluted
condition. Id. Therefore, when cleanup costs are simply spent to restore the
land to its previous condition, they may be currently deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. Id. at *8. However, costs incurred which consti-
tute a general plan of rehabilitation or which have long useful lives must be
capitalized. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Apr. 16, 1993). Costs of conducting
audits are also subject to a factual analysis regarding whether they produce
long-term benefits. Id. However, it is likely that they will be currently deducti-
ble as evaluation costs. Costs of Environmental Cleanup of Land is Currently
Deductible, 23 Fed. Tax Weekly (CCH) 265, 266 (June 9, 1994).
118. Black & Hollander, supra note 13, at 1999.
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tionship with the EPA.119 These factors, together with ex-
pected savings associated with the economically beneficial
result of carrying out pollution prevention programs, 120 make
the use of SEPs an attractive alternative to settling alleged
violations solely with cash payments.
One disadvantage to the EPA in using SEPs is the reduc-
tion in penalty dollars collected, which Congress may per-
ceive as failure to enforce environmental laws vigorously.' 21
Another potential disadvantage to the EPA in negotiating
SEPs is the resources required to enforce the settlements
themselves. 22 Beyond these potential disadvantages, the
EPA has encountered some resistance in using SEPs. First,
the DOJ is sometimes reluctant to promote SEPs.23 The
DOJ takes the position that without statutory authority, like
that found in TSCA, the projects contravene the Anti-Defi-
ciency Act (ADA)'2 4 by impermissibly redirecting penalties
from the U.S. Treasury. 25 The EPA has continued to incor-
porate SEPs in settlements; however, administrative SEPs
are more easily negotiated since they require no concurrence
from the DOJ or the courts.
Additional resistance of potentially great consequence to
the program has come from Representative John Dingell (D-
Mich.), then chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee. Rep. Dingell called for a study by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) in December 1991 to investigate
119. Id.
120. Breen & Dellarco, supra note 1, at 3. Economic savings may be realized
from reduced raw material requirements; decreased waste management, han-
dling, and disposal costs; and lessened potential future cost liabilities for site
cleanups or employee exposure claims resulting from material and waste han-
dling. Id.
121. Enforcement Settlements Push Pollution Prevention, PESTICIDE &
TOXIC CHEM. NEWS, Dec. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Envirn, Allnws.
122. Id. For example, if a violator only paid a penalty, that would end the
EPA's involvement in that case. However, if a consent decree includes an
agreement for the violator to conduct a SEP, additional oversight by the agency
is required to ensure that the violator completes the project.
123. Stephen C. Jones, Creativity Helps Companies Cut Penalties, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 18.
124. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See discussion at section
I(C), infra.
125. Jones, supra note 122, at 18.
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whether the EPA had the authority to reduce a mobile source
penalty under the CAA where the violator agreed to fund a
public awareness program regarding automobile pollution. 126
The GAO concluded that the EPA had acted beyond its statu-
tory authority. 127 The GAO opinion stated that the project
was not acceptable on two bases: (1) the beneficiary of the
penalty payment had no relationship to the violation and had
suffered no injury from the violation; and (2) the Miscellane-
ous Receipts Act (MRA)128 requires payments of penalties to
the U.S. Treasury. 29 Of particular concern is that the EPA
could use SEPs to realize agency goals which go beyond ad-
dressing the violation, thus circumventing the appropriations
process in contravention of the ADA.3So SEPs may violate
these statutes if viewed as "bleeding off" the funds for the
EPA's own benefit.131 The EPA has interpreted this opinion
to apply only narrowly to mobile source issues. 32
126. Comp. Gen., B-247155 at 1 (July 7, 1992). The GAO opinion pertained
to a SEP negotiated under CAA § 205, which addresses mobile source violations
such as excess automobile emissions. Id. Most of the mobile source violations
involved tampering with fuel systems, mislabelling fuel, or improperly fueling a
vehicle. GAO Backs Dingell Opposition to Program in Which New Projects Lead
to Reduced Fines, 23 [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 3201 (Apr. 23,
1993). The proposed public awareness programs were intended to discourage
tampering with automobile pollution control equipment, etc. Id. Often the vio-
lators simply paid a public relations firm to develop and implement the cam-
paign. Id.
127. Comp. Gen., B-247155, supra note 125, at 1.
128. 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See discussion at section
11(C), infra.
129. Comp. Gen., B-247155, supra note 125, at 3. GAO cited two previous
decisions regarding alternative payment policies implemented by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC). Id. at 3. The NRC had proposed that a licensee fund nuclear
safety research in full or partial payment of its assessed penalty. Id. The
CFTC proposed a donation to an educational institution for full or partial pay-
ment of the assessed penalty. Id. at 4. The GAO rejected these proposals on the
same bases as it rejected the proposed mobile source SEP. Id. at 1. Note that
the SEP policy specifically precludes consideration of the types of projects sug-
gested by the NRC and CFTC. SEP Guidance Memorandum, supra note 27, at
5.
130. Legality of SEPs Questioned by GAO; Negotiations Continue in TSCA,
FIFRA, EPCRA Cases, 17 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 99 (Apr. 23, 1993).
131. Id. at 100.
132. Growth Expected, supra note 98, at 2280.
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C. Legal Basis for SEPs
In the PPA, Congress declared the national policy to be
that pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source
whenever feasible and directed the EPA to incorporate pollu-
tion prevention into its programs.'3 In response to this di-
rective, the EPA has included the use of SEPs for
enforcement in its Pollution Prevention Strategy. 34 Use of
SEPs is acceptable since they are provided for within the sub-
stantive statutes, outside the requirements of the MRA and
the ADA, legal as an out-of-court agreement incorporated
into a consent decree, simply a consideration in the applica-
tion of the EPA Civil Penalty Policy, and accepted by Con-
gress through its acquiescence and support.
1. Statutory Basis
The EPA asserts that the various federal environmental
laws provide a statutory basis for use of SEPs in negotiated
agreements designed to address violations.' 35 As discussed
earlier, some statutes incorporate specific provisions sug-
gesting the acceptance of SEPs. For example, TSCA allows
settlement "with or without conditions." 36 The CAA gives
the EPA Administrator the authority to "compromise, modify,
or remit, with or without conditions, any administrative pen-
alty" imposed.' 37 The EPA relies on the more general lan-
133. PPA § 6602, 42 U.S.C. § 13101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
134. Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849-50.
135. Reilly Defends Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects, PESTI-'
CIDE & TOXIC CHEM. NEWS, Jan. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn,
Allnws [hereinafter Reilly Defends Use].
136. TSCA § 16(a)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
137. CAA § 113(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The CAA also provides for "beneficial mitigation projects" in citizen suit en-
forcement. CAA § 304(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The
inclusion of these provisions which allow such projects to be incorporated into
the settlement of citizen suits evidences the congressional recognition of the
benefit of such projects. ("These payments will help to ameliorate air quality
problems rather than merely assess responsibility for their occurrence." SEN-
ATE COMM. ON ENVT AND PUBLIC WORKS, CLEAN AIR ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1990, 136 CONG. REC. H2858 (1990) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 at 2667, 2767
(1993)). However, a critical difference may exist between projects included as
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/7
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guage in EPCRA allowing the Administrator to take into
account "such other matters as justice may require" in deter-
mining appropriate administrative penalties. 138 Analogous
language appears in the penalty provisions of the CWA139 and
the CAA.l40 Similarly, FIFRA provides that the Administra-
tor "shall consider the appropriateness of such penalty given
the size of the business of the person charged, the effect on
the person's ability to continue in business, and the gravity of
the violation."141 The EPA points to these general mitigation
provisions as bases for inclusion of SEPs in enforcement set-
tlements.1 42 Specifically, the flexibility given to the EPA in
determining the appropriate penalty amount is reinforced by
the statutory wording, allowing the inclusion of SEPs in set-
tlements. The SEPs, in turn, are seen as a mitigating factor
that "justice requires" be considered when deciding an appro-
priate penalty amount.143
part of a negotiated settlement between two private parties and one between a
private party and the federal government regarding the necessity of depositing
penalties into the government coffers. The private payments may not vest in
the federal government and would, therefore, be exempt from the Miscellaneous
Receipts Act requirements. However, since a citizen suit plaintiff stands in the
shoes of the government, any assessed penalty must be deposited in the United
States Treasury. Relying on this reasoning, the DOJ has objected to citizen suit
consent decrees containing such projects. District courts are split over whether
to approve the consent decrees with projects or to accept the DOJs advice and
reject them. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found. v. Bellefonte Bor-
ough, 718 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Pa. 1989); contra Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Interstate Paper Corp., Civ. No. 487-169 (S.D. Ga. 1988), reprinted in
19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,901 (1989). For a thorough discussion of
these issues see DAVID S. MANN, Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial
Expenditures: Effective Use or ImproperAbuse of Citizen Suits Under the Clean
Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 175 (1991).
138. EPCRA § 325(b)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
139. CWA § 309(d), (g)(3), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d), (g)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Both the civil and administrative penalty sections list "such other matters as
justice may require" as a factor to be considered in determining the appropriate
penalty amount. Id.
140. CAA § 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
141. FIFRA § 14(a)(4), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
142. Telephone Interview with Michael Walker, Senior Enforcement Coun-
sel, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance (Feb. 7, 1994).
143. Id.
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Although the EPA asserts that it is authorized to include
SEPs in negotiated settlements for those statutes under its
enforcement purview, it does recognize that the policy has
limits. 14 4 These limits are detailed in the SEP policy, which
provides guidelines regarding what constitutes acceptable
SEPs and outlines the nexus requirements. 145 In its opinion
discussed above, the GAO based its finding that the use of
SEPs exceeded the EPA's authority in part, on a lack of rela-
tionship between the project and the violation. 146 If the EPA
strictly follows its nexus requirement, this objection should
be effectively silenced.
2. Application of EPA Civil Penalty Policy
The EPA carries out its statutory enforcement duties
through use of its penalty policies. The reduction in civil pen-
alties attendant to performance of a SEP is simply the result
of applying these policies. The following discussion will use
the provisions set forth in the EPA's Civil Penalty Policy
(Penalty Policy).' 47 However, several of the individual stat-
utes have their own penalty policies.' 48 In general, these pol-
icies track the basic requirements and goals of the general
Penalty Policy. Furthermore, each policy, including the Civil
Penalty Policy, is developed to effect the EPA's statutory
duties.
The EPA develops its penalty policies to carry out its
statutory duty to collect penalties from violators. These poli-
cies promote two main goals: deterrence and fair and equita-
ble treatment of the regulated community. 4 9 The deterrence
component of a penalty, at a minimum, should remove any
144. Reilly Defends Use, supra note 134.
145. Id.
146. Comp. Gen., B-247155, supra note 125, at 1.
147. Civil Penalty Policy, supra, note 27, at 21:0761.
148. See, e.g., EPA Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy,
[Federal Laws] Envt Rep. (BNA) 21:0761 (Oct. 25, 1991); EPA RCRA Civil Pen-
alty Policy, [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 21:5091 (Oct. 29, 1990); EPA Civil
Penalty Policy on the Clean Water Act, [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA)
21:0911 (Feb. 11, 1986).
149. Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 27, at 21:0762-63.
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economic benefit accrued from the violation of the law.1 50
The SEP policy specifically accounts for this consideration in
making the economic benefit the lower limit for the penalty
reduction.151 Beyond this, the Penalty Policy recommends
that an additional amount be included in the penalty to re-
flect the seriousness of the violation and to put the violator in
an economically worse position than would have resulted had
it complied with the law.' 52
Under the second main goal, to provide for fair and equi-
table treatment of the regulated community, the EPA will in-
crease or mitigate the civil penalty amount consisting of the
benefit and gravity components based on the following fac-
tors: degree of willfulness and/or negligence associated with
the violation; the violator's history of noncompliance; its abil-
ity to pay; its degree of cooperation/noncooperation; and
"other unique factors specific to the violator or the case."' 53
By negotiating a SEP, the violator displays behavior warrant-
ing penalty adjustment. First, negotiating a SEP takes time
and resources. Violator cooperation and commitment are re-
quired. Second, the willingness to undertake a SEP and help
benefit the environment is a "unique factor" suggesting miti-
gation would be appropriate. Finally, the EPA has indicated
that SEPs are to be considered when ability to pay is an
issue.154
Additionally, the Penalty Policy includes a third goal of
swift resolution of environmental problems. 155 Recognizing
the agency mission of protecting the environment, the EPA
seeks swift resolution of alleged violations to correct identi-
fied environmental problems. 156 Certainly a negotiated set-
tlement embodying a pollution prevention project achieves
150. Id. at 21:0762.
151. SEP Guidance Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1.
152. Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 27, at 21:0762.
153. Id. at 21:0763.
154. Id. at 21:0772. The Penalty Policy refers to these projects in the Alter-
native Payments section. Id. The SEP policy specifically replaces and super-
sedes this section. SEP Guidance Memorandum, supra note 27, at cover
memorandum.
155. Civil Penalty Policy, supra note 27, at 21:0763.
156. Id.
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this goal. The Penalty Policy provides for a reduction in the
gravity component of an assessed penalty to encourage such
swift resolutions. 157
In negotiating an agreement containing a SEP, the EPA
is simply applying its Civil Penalty Policy. The EPA still re-
quires recoupment of the economic benefit associated with
failure to comply, and usually a gravity component, but is
merely mitigating the penalty based on good faith efforts to
cooperate and attempts for swift resolution. The SEP is not a
substitute for the penalty or part of the penalty, but instead
is a mitigating factor.
3. Miscellaneous Receipts Act and Anti-Deficiency Act
The GAO's second, and primary, objection to the use of
SEPs lies in the requirements under the Miscellaneous Re-
ceipts Act and Anti-Deficiency Act.158 The MRA requires offi-
cials or agents of the federal government to deposit all
collected monies in the United States Treasury. 59 The ADA
prohibits government officials from making an expenditure
exceeding congressionally appropriated amounts or without
appropriation unless authorized by law.' 60
a. Miscellaneous Receipts Act
The basic requirement of the MRA is simply that, absent
specific statutory authority, all funds received for use by and
for the United States must be deposited in the general fund of
the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.' 6' In contrast, where
157. Id.
158. Comp. Gen., B-247155, supra note 125, at 3.
159. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
160. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
161. 62 Comp. Gem 70, 71 (1982). For example, the Veterans Administra-
tion was required to deposit parking fees collected from employees and visitors
of their hospitals. 45 Comp. Gen. 27 (1965). The use of the fees to defray costs
associated with the parking facilities was not provided for in the statute which
authorized the construction and maintenance of garages at the hospitals and
such use was therefore impermissible. Id. Similarly, monies recovered from a
private party or insurer to compensate for damage to a government motor vehi-
cle could not be credited to the agency funds, but had to be deposited into the
general fund. 64 Comp. Gen. 431 (1985).
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a governmental body holds money in trusteeship for a class of
persons affected by the statutory or regulatory violations, it
need not deposit such money into the Treasury. 162 Further,
no such requirement attaches where Congress has specifi-
cally provided for a different method of handling or disposing
of received monies. 163
Thus, where specific statutory authority exists to retain
collected funds or to handle such funds differently, the MRA
is inapplicable. This is the case with SEPs. The funds at is-
sue are the resultant reduced penalty increment from the in-
clusion of a SEP in the settlement agreement. As discussed
above, Congress has given the EPA broad discretion in deter-
mining penalty amounts. Beyond the "catch-all" factor gener-
ally included in the statute, Congress authorized
consideration of factors such as "nature, circumstances, ex-
tent and gravity of the violation, or violations, and, with re-
spect to the violator, ability to pay, any prior history of such
violations, the degree of culpability, [and] economic benefit or
savings (if any) resulting from the violation."164 This broad
discretion provides the specific statutory authority to handle
collected funds differently. Any funds not "collected" from the
maximum statutory penalty, due to the consideration of one
162. 60 Comp. Gen. 15 (1980). Therefore, the Department of Energy (DOE)
would be required to deposit monies received from oil companies pursuant to a
consent order unless the monies were returned to victims suffering from the oil
companies' violations. Id. The consent decree addressed alleged violations of
the petroleum price and allocation regulations. Id. Where the Department re-
turned the monies to the victims of the overcharges, it was acting simply as a
trustee; but, where the DOE distributed monies to a class of individuals not
likely to have suffered from overcharges, the distribution would be a violation of.
the Act. Id.
163. United States v. Brendel, 136 F. 737 (2d Cir. 1905). In Brendel, con-
gressionally authorized Treasury regulations required that monies collected as
custom duties be transported in accordance with a particular contract. Id. at
739. Thus, the defendant could not be held liable for loss of the funds afier
depositing them with the transportation contractor, as required by regulation.
Id. at 740. The case applied to the predecessor of the MRA.
164. CWA § 309(g)(3), U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See also
EPCRA § 325(b)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 11,045(b)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
FIFRA § 14(a)(4), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); CAA § 113(e)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); and TSCA § 16(a)(1)(B), 15
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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of the listed factors in the applicable statute, are directly au-
thorized by law.165 Consideration of SEPs in deciding the
penalty amount is simply consideration of the statutorily au-
thorized penalty-determination factor of "as justice requires."
Another argument can be made that the EPA, in al-
lowing SEPs in settlement agreements, is holding the re-
duced penalty increment in trusteeship for the public. The
environment and the public are the victims of a violation of a
statute's directives. In requiring the violator to undertake
projects designed to better the surrounding environment, the
SEPs, in effect, compensate the public for its loss. The nexus
requirements help ensure that the class of individuals receiv-
ing the benefit is appropriate based on the violation.
b. Anti-Deficiency Act
The intent of the ADA is to "prevent the Departments
from incurring financial obligations over and above those au-
thorized in advance by Congress." 66 The obligations refer
not only to financial contractual obligations, but include ac-
ceptance of voluntary service and employment of personal
service in excess of that authorized by law.167 The ADA re-
flects the requirements of the Appropriations Clause of the
Constitution,168 in that it helps ensure that public funds are
spent "according to the letter of the difficult judgments
reached by Congress as to the common good, and not accord-
ing to the individual favor of Government agents or the indi-
vidual pleas of litigants." 69 But a contract or other
obligation will not be in contravention of the Act if it is not
enforceable for future payment of money170 or if the duty is
165. In fact, the maximum statutory penalty is rarely, if ever, assessed.
166. 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 51, 53 (1913).
167. Id.
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
169. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,427 (1990).
Therefore, for example, the Secretary of the Navy was prohibited from continu-
ing work on an uncompleted dry dock after appropriation was exhausted, even
if immediate action was essential. 21 Op. Atty Gen. 288 (1896).
170. 42 Comp. Gen. 81 (1962).
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not contingent upon congressional appropriations. 171 Thus,
where a federal statute requires absolute action, the govern-
ment will be held liable although appropriations were
inadequate. 172
The perceived problem of SEPs regarding the ADA is
that the EPA could use SEPs to carry out agency goals that
are beyond remedying the particular violation, thus circum-
venting the congressional appropriation process. However,
this is not accurate. Congress does appropriate enforcement
monies to be spent according to the dictates of the various
federal environmental statutes. As discussed above, in refer-
ence to the MRA, the EPA is working well within the statu-
tory limits.
Furthermore, the requirements of the ADA will not apply
if a statute requires absolute action or establishes an obliga-
tion that is not enforceable for future payment of unappropri-
ated funds by the government. The environmental statutes
do require absolute action. The EPA is given the duty, de-
pending on the statute, to protect the nation's environment.
The EPA fulfills this duty, in part, by enforcement against
violators of a particular statute. None of the statutes suggest
that the duty to enforce is dependent on appropriations for
particular enforcement activities. The enforcement is left to
the discretion of the agency. Thus, where the EPA performs
its enforcement duty in accordance with the applicable stat-
ute, no ADA violation can result, despite lack of congressional
appropriation for a specific activity.
171. San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage Dist. v. United States, 23 C1. Ct.
276, 283 (1991) (duty of the United States to operate and maintain a dam was
not contingent upon congressional appropriations, so the contract between the
government and the irrigation district was given effect).
172. Shipman v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 138 (1883). The court indicated
that where authorization to enter a contract depends wholly on appropriations,
no officer has power to create liability for the United States in excess of that
amount. Id. However, where a statute authorizes something to be done abso-
lutely, the officer is "clothed with authority" to perform that duty without limi-
tation as to cost. Id. The decision is based on the distinction between 31 U.S.C.
§ 1341(a)(1)(A), which prohibits spending in excess of appropriation, and 31
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(B), which prohibits obligation prior to appropriation unless
authorized by law.
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The other potential issue regarding the ADA and SEPs is
the perceived deficiency in the Treasury resulting from the
"uncollected" penalty. Arguments against this problem mir-
ror those discussed above regarding the MRA.
4. Legality of Consent Decrees
Furthermore, the EPA will violate neither the MRA nor
the ADA if a proposed SEP is not considered a civil penalty.
If the SEP is labeled a civil penalty, then payment should be
made to the United States Treasury.173 However, if the SEP
is not labeled a civil penalty or no liability is admitted, the
settlement is simply an out-of-court agreement that the par-
ties are free to make. 174 If the parties desire to incorporate
their settlement into a judicially approved consent decree,
the court must review the agreement for fairness, reasonable-
ness, and adequacy. 175 Specifically the court "must be certain
that the decree 1) 'spring[s] from and serve[s] to resolve a dis-
pute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction,' 2)
'come[s] within the general scope of the case made by the
pleadings,' and 3) 'further[s] the objectives of the law upon
which the complaint was based.' "176 Regarding suits affect-
ing the public interest, which an environmental enforcement
action invariably is, the court must be certain the settlement
upholds the objective of the applicable statute.177 This may
173. Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, 909 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir.
1990); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn
Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 82 (3d Cir. 1990).
174. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1354.
175. United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 F.2d 1040,
1044 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Telluride Co., 849 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (D.
Colo. 1994).
176. Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Local
Number 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525
(1986)).
177. Telluride, 849 F. Supp., supra note 174, at 1402. In Telluride, the
United States had commenced suit alleging violation of the CWA against the
Telluride Company, Mountain Village Company, Inc., and the Telluride Ski
Area, Inc. Id. at 1401. The complaint asserted that the defendants had filled in
approximately 44.5 acres of wetlands without acquiring a permit, in violation of
the Act. Id. On the day the suit was filed, the government lodged a consent
decree with the court which proposed a full settlement. The court rejected the
decree on the grounds that it was not "fair, reasonable and adequate or in the
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/7
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS
be ascertained, in part, through an analysis of "(1) whether
the decree is technically adequate to accomplish the goal of
cleaning the environment, (2) whether it will sufficiently com-
pensate the public for the costs of remedial measures, and (3)
whether it reflects the relative strength or weakness of the
government's case against the environmental offender."178
Furthermore, entering a consent decree is not a judg-
ment on the merits of the action. Therefore, the decree need
not strictly adhere to the statutory civil penalty provision.' 7 9
As such, within the exercise of the court's equitable discre-
tion, remedies and restitution in forms other than civil penal-
ties may be incorporated in settlement agreements. °80 "[A]
... court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent
decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than
the court could have awarded after a trial."181
In consideration of all these requirements, a SEP is an
appropriate remedy to be incorporated into a consent decree.
Although the potential civil penalty is reduced, the consent
decree can still meet the requirement of being fair, reason-
able, and adequate. First, a consent decree resulting from vi-
olation of a federal environmental statute will undoubtedly
come under the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Second, provided the United States' complaint was
sufficient, the requirement of coming within the scope of the
pleadings can generally be met. Third, incorporating a SEP
in a consent decree helps to ensure appropriate redress of the
public interest." Id. at 1401-02. In rejecting the decree, the court stated its role
was "more searching" when public interests are at stake and rejected the decree
since it did not adequately fulfill the objectives of the CWA, specifically citing
the procedural irregularities and the governmenefs improper reliance on the de-
fendant's own environmental expert. Id. at 1402-04.
178. Id. at 1402.
179. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 952 F.2d, supra note 174, at 1044.
The Eight Circuit stated, "the District Court was not required to apply the stan-
dards of section 1319(d) [of the CWA], which spells out the factors to be used in
determining the appropriate civil penalty to be levied against a party found to
be in violation of the Clean Water Act." Id.
180. United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 ELR 21,073, 21,077 (S.C. Ind.
1991). This is so because of the decree's contractual nature. Id.
181. Local Number 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 525 (1986).
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violation while furthering the various statutes' goals. While
the civil penalty is also assessed in the decree and remains a
deterrence, 8 2 the SEP is an additional remedy, serving resti-
tution purposes, not unlike injunctive relief. The SEP itself
is not a civil penalty, but a mitigating factor in determining
an appropriate penalty amount.183 Since it is not a civil pen-
alty, payment need not be made to the Treasury. Therefore,
under traditional principles followed by courts in assessing a
consent decree, the presence of a SEP is not a sufficient basis
to disapprove the decree. Rather, the presence of the SEP in
the decree may help to make the decree fair, reasonable, and
adequate in consideration of the need to address the public
interest.
5. Congressional Acquiescence
In addition to these legal bases for SEPs, Congress is
aware of the use of SEPs by the EPA, and has, through legis-
lative history and proposed bills, stamped this approach with
their approval. In amending the CWA, Congress specifically
encouraged such creative settlements of fines and penalties
that further the goals of the Act.' 8 4 More recently, Congress
has provided for SEPs in proposed bills. One such bill would
amend the CWA relating to civil penalties. 8 5 The bill would
specifically authorize the Administrator of the EPA to order
that the violator spend a portion of an administrative or civil
182. SEP Guidance Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 84-97.
184. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1986).
In certain instances settlements of fines and penalties levied
due to NPDES permit and other violations have been used to fund
research, development and other related projects which further the
goals of the Act. In these cases, the funds collected in connection
with these violations were used to investigate pollution problems
other than those leading to the violation. Settlements of this type
preserve the punitive nature of enforcement actions while putting
the funds collected to use on behalf of environmental protection.
Although this practice has been used on a selective basis, the con-
ferees encourage this procedure where appropriate.
Id.
185. H.R. 1907, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill is currently pending.
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penalty in carrying out SEPs.18 6 Another bill proposes the
creation of the Clean Water Trust Fund.1 8 7 Monies from en-
forcement actions under the CWA would be deposited into the
fund for use by the Administrator to restore waters from
damages resulting from violations of the Act. L88 Representa-
tive Peter Visclosky, the bill's sponsor, specifically indicated
that the bill would not preclude the EPA from seeking SEPs
as part of settlements.18 9 These examples display Congres-
sional acquiescence to the EPA's use of SEPs and provide
support for the assertion that use of SEPs does not violate the
appropriations process.
IV. Conclusion
Federal environmental enforcement has shifted its focus
from end-of-the-pipe regulation to pollution prevention. This
shift is apparent in recent legislative developments including
the certification and land-ban requirements in RCRA, the
TRI of EPCRA, and the recent enactment of the PPA. The
EPA has incorporated this approach in its regulatory pro-
grams through its Pollution Prevention Strategy, which, in
part, calls for inclusion of SEPs in enforcement settlement
agreements. SEPs are pollution prevention projects that an
alleged violator performs in exchange for a reduction in civil
penalties. The EPA's encouragement of the use of SEPs is a
natural outgrowth of the shift in focus from end-of-the-pipe
control strategies to pollution prevention. SEPs allow multi-
ple benefits: to the EPA in the resultant benefit to the envi-
ronment and decreased potential for future violation; to the
186. Id.
187. H.R. 1801, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill is currently pending.
188. Id. Rep. Visclosky indicates, "[ilt does not make sense for scarce re-
sources to go into the bottomless pit of the Treasury's general fund, especially if
we fail to solve our serious water quality problems due to lack of funds." Mem-
bers of Congress Offer Legislation to Improve Water Quality in Great Lakes, 24
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 424, 425 (July 9, 1993) [hereinafter
Members of Congress Offer Legislation].
189. Members of Congress Offer Legislation, supra note 188, at 425. Further-
more, Rep. Visclosky "strongly support[s] the use of SEP's [sic] to facilitate the
cleanup of serious environmental problems." 139 CONG. REC. E998 (daily ed.
Apr. 21, 1993).
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environment by addressing waste generation issues not sub-
ject to injunctive relief; and even to the violator by conferring
a tax benefit, good press, and increased revenues due to the
attendant decrease in waste generation. As such, this pro-
gram has great promise in that it positively affects the future
conduct of a current violator and its waste generation and
handling procedures.
Unfortunately, this approach has met with some resist-
ance due to a perception that, in using SEPs, the EPA has
exceeded its statutory authority. The arguments supporting
such a stance are outlined in the GAO opinion denying the
EPA's ability to include SEPs in settlements negotiated
under CAA section 205. The GAO based its conclusion on the
lack of nexus between the SEP and the violation, and the ap-
plication of the MRA and ADA.
Since the adoption of the EPA's SEP policy, the first of
these objections is no longer valid since the policy requires a
nexus. Secondly, the MRA and the ADA are not applicable to
SEPs since the substantive statutes provide a statutory basis
for inclusion. In granting the EPA broad discretion in deter-
mining penalty amounts, the "uncollected" reduction in pen-
alty is outside the requirement of the MRA that all collected
monies be deposited in the U.S. Treasury. Additionally, the
reduction may be considered as held in trust for the public,
and, therefore, also beyond the statute's reach. Equally per-
suasive arguments show the ADA is inapplicable to SEPs.
First, the substantive statutes require absolute action, i.e.,
enforcement of the statutory provisions and, thus, no appro-
priation is required for action. Moreover, the EPA is working
within its appropriated budget for enforcement and has not
incurred any deficiency.
Further support for the legality of SEPs is found in the
application of the EPA's Penalty Policy; in assessment of con-
sent decrees using general court review standards and in
Congressional acquiescence. Application of the EPA's Pen-
alty Policy shows that performance of a SEP should and,
under the Penalty Policy, would be cause to reduce the pen-
alty based on good faith and desire for swift resolution. Also,
since the EPA SEP policy requires that the economic benefit
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/7
1995] ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 825
of the violation be recovered in penalty dollars, the Penalty
Policy is not violated. When reviewed in a consent decree, a
SEP takes on the status of an equitable remedy allowable in
the agreement because of its contractual nature. Finally,
Congress has been aware of the use of SEPs and has, on sev-
eral occasions, specifically approved of these programs.
These considerations support the acceptability of SEPs in
enforcement settlement agreements. The use of SEPs allows
an enforcement action to take on a character that has great
potential to benefit the environment. Moreover, SEPs ad-
vance the national policy as announced in both RCRA and
PPA. The nation must move toward pollution prevention in
order to overcome its pollution problems effectively and effi-
ciently. The use of SEPs is a step in this direction.
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